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KEEP CALM AND PLEAD ON: WHY NEW EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE SHOULD TEMPER FEARS ABOUT PLEADING
PLAUSIBILITY
Alex D. Silagi*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the years since the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic v.
1
2
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court’s unexpected take on
pleading led a majority of civil proceduralists to treat these decisions
3
Most considered the
with apprehension and disappointment.
decisions a drastic departure from a century of precedent in favor of
liberal notice-pleading standards that threatened to close the gates of
4
justice to many meritorious, if inexactly pleaded, claims. On the
other hand, those that agreed with the decisions felt that they
constituted a much needed check on wasteful litigation and
expensive discovery battles based on no more than the most
5
speculative of legal theories.

*J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2014; B.A., English and
History, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 2011.
1
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
3
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen
C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2010); Elizabeth
M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact
on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010); A.
Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 185 (2010); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to
Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15 (2010); Howard M.
Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 157 (2010).
4
See, e.g., Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal
Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 65 (2010) (criticizing “plausibility” pleading and its effect on civil
actions in general and civil rights cases in particular, where informational inequities
abound).
5
See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063,
1091–92 (2009) (“Twombly must be viewed as part of a broader trend in which the
Court recognizes the importance of imposing real and meaningful judicial scrutiny
at the pleading stage, particularly as cases become more costly and complex to
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Rarest of all are the commentators that predicted a tempered
6
application of the cases’ “plausibility” language. This Comment
aligns itself with this small group by focusing on recent empirical
studies and case law surveys that show how little has changed since
Twombly and Iqbal.
Perhaps it is best at the outset to say what this Comment does
not do. This Comment does not take a position on whether the
Supreme Court was right to make its changes in the two decisions.
That is for another publication, and indeed, tomes could be made
from the many articles written on the topic. Instead, this Comment
has two main goals: first, to synthesize and analyze the most recent
empirical data on the current state of pleading, which led to the
conclusion that Twombly and Iqbal did not cause the much-feared
seismic shift to pleading that many predicted; and second, to suggest
reasons for these unexpected results. The goal of this Comment is to
plan the appropriate next steps for pleading standards given the
much needed, tempered reevaluation put forth below.
Part II of this Comment will explain the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Twombly and Iqbal. Beginning with Twombly, the first of
the two to go before the Court, this Part will address the Court’s
attempt to effect change in the standard for sufficient pleading under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (Rule 8)—that is, in relevant part,
that a complaint must now satisfy a “plausibility” standard. Part II will
then go on to explain how the Court’s decision in Iqbal solidified that
standard’s place in federal civil trials. Part III will draw from
representative sets of academic, judicial, and legislative materials
published in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal that express deep concern
over, and confusion about, the decisions. By a significant measure,
these voices represent the majority in the legal community. Part IV
summarizes and synthesizes empirical studies conducted by the
Federal Judicial Center, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, and a
case law survey conducted by Andrea Kuperman, the Advisory
Committee Clerk. Taken together, these Reports show that civil
complaints are not affected by motions to dismiss any more than they
were in the years leading up to Twombly. Finally, Part V will argue
that the courts, collectively, are applying a tempered interpretation of
litigate.”).
6
See Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
473, 474 (2010) (“Rather than decrying Twombly as a radical departure and seeking
to overturn it, this Article instead emphasizes Twombly’s connection to prior law and
suggests ways in which it can be tamed.”); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem,
62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010).
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Twombly and Iqbal and will suggest common trends among the circuit
courts for applying “plausibility.” It will then suggest that these
under-utilized findings demand more attention than they are
currently receiving, and that the case law shows a consistency of
application that future breaks from precedent or rule amendments
would only upset.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF PLAUSIBILITY: TWOMBLY & IQBAL
A. Conley v. Gibson

7

In 1957, the Supreme Court addressed the standards for
8
sufficient pleading under Rule 8. Although not the first case before
the Court concerning pleading standards, Conley v. Gibson introduced
the paradigmatic “no set of facts” language that would guide
9
procedural precedent for decades to come.
Conley involved a labor relations suit brought under the Railway
Labor Act by African-American rail workers against their national
10
union, its local branch, and the officers of both. Facing allegations
that they failed to adequately represent their African-American
members against discriminatory firings, the union defendants raised
a successful motion to dismiss at the trial level, which the Fifth Circuit
11
affirmed. Writing for the Court, however, Justice Black reversed the
ruling, noting the following:
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of
7

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(a) reads:
(a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must
contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the
claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may
include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
The Federal Rules were promulgated in 1938, largely in response to the perceived
flaws inherent in previous pleading regimes: English common law pleading, with its
writ system and issue pleading; and code pleading, which, in the United States,
replaced the common law approach with fact pleading and recognized the civil
action. See Peter Julian, Charles E. Clark and Simple Pleading: Against a “Formalism of
Generality”, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1179, 1184–87 (2010).
9
Conley, 355 U.S. at 45; see Smith, supra note 5, at 1069 (describing the language
from Conley as a “longstanding interpretation of the Federal Rules”).
10
Conley, 355 U.S. at 42–43.
11
Id. at 42–44.
8
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course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
12
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
The opinion continued:
[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a
claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases
his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is “a short
plain statement of the claim” that will give the defendant
fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds
13
upon which it rests.
14
Relying on that proposition, the Court ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor.
From a substantive perspective, the decision was just one piece
15
in the larger push for justice in the civil rights era.
From a
procedural scope, though, Conley was one of the most pivotal cases of
the twentieth century, and the Court’s “no set of facts” language was
16
fundamental to the modern understanding of pleading. Over the
next half-century, the decision was one of the most frequently quoted
procedural expressions, and many considered it to be the
embodiment of the Federal Rules’ commitment to liberal pleading
17
standards.
B. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly
Coming before the Court in late 2006, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly
presented the high court justices with the opportunity to address
pleading standards for one of the first times since Conley—this time,
18
in an antitrust context. William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus
represented a putative class consisting of local telephone and highspeed Internet service subscribers against a group of Incumbent
19
Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs). As the opinion explains, ILECs
made up a system of regional service monopolies that resulted from
20
the 1984 divestiture of AT&T’s local telephone business.
ILECs
12

Id. at 45–46 (emphasis added).
Id. at 47 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
14
Id. at 48.
15
Andrew I. Gavil, Civil Rights and Civil Procedure: The Legacy of Conley v. Gibson,
52 HOW. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2008).
16
Id. at 1.
17
Id. at 1–2.
18
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
19
Id. at 550.
20
Id. at 549.
13
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enjoyed their regional monopolies until the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, which obligated ILECs to share their networks with
21
competitors, known as competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs).
Under two circumstantial theories, the plaintiffs alleged
22
violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a federal law that
prohibits businesses from engaging in certain types of
23
anticompetitive conduct. First, the complaint alleged that the ILECs
engaged in parallel business behavior in their respective regions
against CLECs that frustrated and sabotaged the CLECs’ operations
24
so as to inhibit their growth.
Second, it alleged that the ILECs
agreed not to compete with each other, as inferred from their
common failure to pursue appealing business opportunities in
25
neighboring markets. The Supreme Court granted certiorari after
the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit disagreed
over whether the allegations met the standard for factual sufficiency
26
and could survive a motion to dismiss.
Justice Souter, writing for the seven-member majority, reversed
the Second Circuit’s denial of the motion to dismiss and strongly
27
addressed the Court’s Rule 8 precedent.
Over Justice Stevens’
forceful dissent, Justice Souter took a hardline approach to Conley’s
“no set of facts” language that, in the Justice’s view, “has been
28
questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough.”
The
opinion locates this criticism’s source in Conley’s lenient language
that, if read literally, would allow wholly conclusory statements to
survive a motion to dismiss and, essentially, allow plaintiffs to engage
in expensive discovery fishing expeditions. Courts, the majority
contended, have read Conley as pleading guidelines, rather than
21

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 550; see Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (prohibiting “[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations”).
23
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 551.
26
Id. at 552–53. The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that
parallel business conduct was insufficient on its own to state a claim under § 1 and
adding that the plaintiff needed to plead additional factual allegations that tended to
exclude the ILECs’ independent self-interest as an explanation. Id. at 552 (citing
Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). The Second
Circuit reversed, holding that “plus factors are not required to be pleaded to permit
an antitrust claim based on parallel conduct to survive.” Id. at 553 (quoting Twombly
v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005)) (emphasis in original).
27
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
28
Id. at 562.
22
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29

applying its literal requirements. As such, Justice Souter goes on to
write in no uncertain terms, “after puzzling the profession for 50
30
years, this famous observation has earned its retirement.”
In its place, the Court adopted what appeared to be a
31
“plausibility” requirement.
The majority organized the Court’s Rule 8 precedent as follows:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations . . . a
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of his
“entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do . . . . Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
32
level . . . .
As to how far above the speculative level factual allegations must
reach, the opinion answered— in what seemed to be exclusively the
antitrust context—by asking for plausible grounds to read an anti33
competitive agreement into a complaint. It then noted, though, “we
do not require heightened fact pleading on specifics, but only
34
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
With its opinion, the majority changed the direction of its pleading
jurisprudence, but the scope of this redirection was not entirely clear.
The entire Court did not view this redirection favorably. Justice
Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined in three of four parts,
wrote a pointed dissent, calling Justice Souter’s opinion a “dramatic
35
departure from settled procedural law.” The crux of the dissent
flowed from the historical motivations behind Rule 8 and Conley’s
29

Id. (“[A] good many judges and commentators have balked at taking the
literal terms of the Conley passage as a pleading standard.”) (collecting cases).
30
Id. at 563. To add to the confusion this decision created, two weeks after
Justice Souter “retired” Conley’s language, the Court seemed to reaffirm the standard
that Conley represented in Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). In that case, the
Court, quoting both Twombly and Conley, wrote, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary;
the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.’” Id. at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted). This
apparent inconsistency led several courts to question whether Twombly did, in fact,
abrogate Conley to the extent many predicted. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d
816, 817 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Twombly and Iqbal did not abrogate the notice pleading
standard of Rule 8(a)(2).”).
31
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
32
Id. at 555 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
33
Id. at 570.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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connection to notice pleading’s history. Conley’s language, Justice
Stevens wrote, “captures the policy choice embodied in the Federal
37
Rules and binding on the federal courts.” In his view, the policy
choice was to rework the procedural system from a stringent codepleading standard riddled with procedural pitfalls to a noticepleading system, which made it easier for plaintiffs to get their day in
38
court. According to the dissent, the majority opinion’s call for the
39
pleading of facts was antithetical to this choice. Even worse, the
majority’s reading of Conley “express[es] an evidentiary standard,
40
which the Conley Court had neither need nor want to explicate.”
Justice Stevens argued that the majority was rewriting the federal
pleading rules when the case’s resolution did not require that and,
further, did so outside of the deliberative procedures that the federal
41
courts have for making such a change. Ultimately, Justice Stevens
viewed “plausibility” as a new heightened and misguided pleading
42
standard.
C. Ashcroft v. Iqbal
Two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court made its intentions
in Twombly more explicit and elaborated how Rule 8 sufficiency-ofpleading issues should be addressed in the future. John Ashcroft, the
former Attorney General of the United States, and Robert Mueller,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), petitioned
the Supreme Court after the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of
43
their motion to dismiss Javaid Iqbal’s complaint. Iqbal, a Muslim
and a citizen of Pakistan, was arrested in the United States as part of a
large investigation relating to the September 11th terrorist attacks
44
and was held in custody as a “high interest” detainee.
After
deportation pursuant to his guilty plea, Iqbal brought suit against a
bevy of federal officials, alleging deprivations of his constitutional

36

Id. at 573–77. The intent-of-the-rules-drafters argument in Stevens’ dissent was
adopted by many critics of the decision. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
37
Twombly, 556 U.S. at 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38
Id. at 579.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 580.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 582.
43
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009).
44
Id. at 666–67. “High-interest” detainees were held under the most restrictive
conditions allowable in federal prisons, which prevented these detainees from
communicating with the general prison population. Id. at 667–68.
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45

rights during his detainment.
As to Ashcroft and Mueller, the
complaint alleged that Iqbal’s harsh confinement was the result of an
unconstitutional policy that the two men adopted on account of his
46
race, religion, or national origin.
Justice Kennedy, delivering the opinion of the Court, reversed
the Second Circuit’s decision and held that Iqbal’s pleadings were
47
insufficient. The issue called on the Court to address ambiguities in
its Twombly decision. Returning to that opinion, Justice Kennedy
derived a two-step process from Justice Souter’s earlier analysis for
determining a complaint’s sufficiency under Rule 8: first, the court
need not accept as true any allegations contained in the complaint
that are merely legal conclusions; second, sufficient complaints must
48
state a plausible claim for relief.
As to the first working principle, Justice Kennedy read out of
Twombly that “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
49
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
The
Justice added, “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from
the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does
not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing
50
more than conclusions.” The court must weed through a complaint,
searching for its “nub”—the well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual
allegations—and isolate those for a determination of their
51
sufficiency. As to the second principle, the court will determine a
complaint’s sufficiency by assessing whether the claims have been
52
This
nudged “across the line from conceivable to plausible.”
“context-specific task” that draws on “judicial experience and
common sense” requires enough well-pleaded facts to “permit the
53
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.”
The allegations in Iqbal’s complaint, according to the majority
that did not include Justice Souter, failed to nudge across the line to
54
plausibility.
As per the first step, the majority engaged in the
45

Id.
Id. at 666.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 678–79.
49
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)).
50
Id. at 678–79.
51
Id. at 680 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565–66).
52
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
53
Id. at 679 (citation omitted).
54
Id. at 680. Justice Kennedy’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
46
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weeding-out process by separating the conclusory from the
nonconclusory allegations. The majority labeled Iqbal’s allegations
that Ashcroft was “‘the principal architect’ of [this] invidious policy”
and that he “‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously
agreed to subject’ [Iqbal] to harsh . . . confinement ‘. . . solely on
account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin,’” as nothing
more than “formulaic recitations of the elements” of a constitutional
55
discrimination claim and thus could not be accepted as true. Next,
the Court isolated and assessed the remaining nonconclusory
56
allegations that were entitled to assumptions of truth.
Those
allegations stated:
[T]he [FBI] under the direction of Defendant MUELLER,
arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as
part of its investigation of the events of September 11. . . .
[and] [t]he policy of holding post-September-11th
detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement
until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI was approved by
Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in
57
the weeks after September 11, 2001.
The question, as per the second step, was whether these
nonconclusory allegations were plausible, and not merely
conceivable. The majority accepted as true the allegation that Arab
Muslim men were being detained, and Ashcroft and Mueller
58
Nonetheless, although these allegations
approved of the policy.
were consistent with petitioners’ theory of an unconstitutional
discriminatory policy, the Court held Iqbal’s claims to be implausible
59
in light of “more likely explanations.” The Court found an obvious
alternative explanation whereby anybody involved with the Arab
Muslim September 11th perpetrators would likely also happen to be
60
Islamic Arabs. To the majority, it was no surprise that “a legitimate
policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals
because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a
[constitutionally permissible] disparate, incidental impact on Arab

Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Interestingly, Justice Souter, who penned the
Twombly decision, filed a dissenting opinion here, in which Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Id. at 665.
55
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680–81 (2009) (quoting the complaint).
56
Id. at 681.
57
Id. (quoting complaint) (internal citations omitted).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.

SILAGI (DO NOT DELETE)

256

1/10/2014 3:51 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:247

61

Muslims.” Interestingly, though, the majority acknowledged that if
they were required to read the allegation as true, the complaint
62
Therefore, the Court
would survive the motion to dismiss.
concluded that, under Twombly’s standard, the complaint failed to
‘“nudge Iqbal’s claims’ of invidious discrimination ‘across the line
63
from conceivable to plausible.’”
Conversely, the dissenting Justices, led by Justice Souter,
considered these allegations to be outside the realm of mere legal
conclusions when read in the appropriate context of the full
64
complaint.
While Justice Souter agreed that the two statements
singled out by the majority do not state a plausible entitlement to
relief, “[t]he fallacy of the majority’s opinion . . . lies in looking at the
65
relevant assertions in isolation.”
Had it read the complaint
holistically, giving due attention to the subsidiary allegations, the
66
majority would not have been left with merely these two statements.
According to Justice Souter, the majority had improperly isolated the
parts of the complaint that list the elements of the claim and labeled
them as bare conclusions. Yet Iqbal’s complaint goes beyond merely
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a constitutional
discrimination claim because the elements are preceded by a
description of “a particular, discrete, discriminatory policy detailed in
67
the complaint.” Taking the complaint as a whole, the allegations
68
should have been assumed true. Furthermore, the allegations were
69
plausibly true, and not merely consistent with illegal conduct. The
dissent stated that, contrary to the conduct in Twombly, which was
“consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with” rational
business strategy, here Iqbal’s allegations of discriminatory policy and
Ashcroft’s knowledge and deliberate indifference could not be
70
consistent with legal conduct. As such, the complaint should have

61

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682.
Id. at 686 (“Were we required to accept this allegation as true, respondent’s
complaint would survive petitioners’ motion to dismiss. But the Federal Rules do not
require courts to credit a complaint’s conclusory statements without reference to its
factual context.”).
63
Id. at 680 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
64
Id. at 696–97 (Souter, J., dissenting).
65
Id. at 698.
66
Id.
67
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 698.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 696.
70
Id. at 696–97.
62
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71

been deemed plausible on its face.
Plainly, the Iqbal Court’s attempt to address the ambiguities in
Twombly was not very successful. The majority did respond to several
arguments that attempted to define the decision’s scope. First,
answering Justice Stevens’ question in Twombly, the Court refused to
limit its decision in that case to pleadings made in the antitrust
context, noting that Twombly was based on the Court’s interpretation
72
and application of Rule 8.
Second, the trial court’s case
management and discovery controls do not temper the application of
the plausibility standard, even in cases like Iqbal’s where the trial
73
judge made clear his desire to limit discovery for the petitioners.
But as Justice Souter’s dissent illustrates, the application of a
“plausibility standard” was still somewhat nebulous, especially
considering the Justice’s belief that the majority “misapplie[d] the
74
pleading standard” that he penned in Twombly. The end result was
two decisions that attacked head-on over a half-century of procedural
precedent and created additional problems that were not fully
reconciled.
III. THE SUBSEQUENT PANIC: RESPONDING TO TWOMBLY AND IQBAL
While Twombly and Iqbal left significant procedural questions
hanging in the air, it opened the floodgates to a legal community in
search of answers. Yet, as is the case with most legal ambiguities,
75
answers were not easy to come by. The lingering uncertainty about
proper pleading standards and access to courts bred anxiety among
76
77
78
79
legal scholars, the judiciary, commentators, and practitioners
71

See Id. at 696–97.
Id. at 684.
73
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684–85.
74
Id. at 688 (Souter, J., dissenting).
75
See, e.g., Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We
are not alone in finding the opinion confusing.”) (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143,
157 (2d Cir. 2007)).
76
See sources cited supra note 3.
77
In fact, not long after Iqbal, Justice Ginsberg publically remarked: “[i]n my
view, the [Iqbal] Court’s majority messed up the Federal Rules.” Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Remarks for Second Circuit
Judicial Conference (June 12, 2009), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov
/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_06-12-09.html.
78
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11 Could Lead to a Broad Shift on Civil
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009, at A10. This article, which read Iqbal as “mak[ing]
it much easier for judges to dismiss civil lawsuits right after they are filed,” quotes
Thomas C. Goldstein, an appellate lawyer with Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld in
Washington: “Iqbal is the most significant Supreme Court decision in a decade for
72
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alike. When the legal community published on the issue, fear and
panic became the common theme.
The overarching concern is that the Supreme Court’s decisions
regress pleading standards to the earlier, painfully strict fact or code
80
pleading process.
Twombly and Iqbal signaled for many critics a
move away from the simplicity for which Rule 8 asked—a move that
81
they believe was not intended by the Rule’s drafters. The drafters’
intentions, critics often mention, were guided by two procedural
decisions: to reshape civil litigation to allow more access to courts and
to promote a complaint’s adjudication based on its merits, rather
82
than to require dismissal for mere procedural slip-ups. Such priority
changes brought about by the Federal Rules were guided by the
philosophy that justice could only be served by allowing citizens to
83
fully enforce their rights.
This concept echoed the baseline
democratic tenet upon which civil rights, distributive justice, and
84
equal opportunity rested.
Thus, many critics fear that a
“plausibility” standard attacks the most basic policy goals that Rule 8
seeks to protect.
Fearing that the Rule’s fundamental principles were under
attack, the backlash was powerful. One author wrote, “[t]he
Supreme Court should put a notice on all federal courthouse doors:
85
STOP- ENTRANCE BY INVITATION ONLY!”
Another stated
day-to-day litigation in the federal courts.” Id.
79
See Vince Warren on Access to Justice in Federal Courts (NYU Law), CCRJUSTICE.ORG,
http://ccrjustice.org/learn-more/videos/vince-warren-access-justice-federal-courtsnew-york-university-school-law (Jan. 2010).
80
See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 20 (2010) (“[T]he pleading
requirement has become one of notice-plus. In reality, that is a form of fact pleading
by another name.”). In many ways, this baseline principle is guided by, and
sometimes merely reiterates, Justice Stevens’ dissent in Twombly. C.f. Clermont &
Yeazell, supra note 3, at 832–33 (arguing that the Court did not readopt fact
pleading, but created an unprecedented test for “factual convincingness”).
81
Miller, supra note 80, at 19 (“By establishing plausibility pleading, Twombly and
Iqbal, have transformed the function of a complaint from Conley’s limited role by
imposing a more demanding standard that requires a greater factual foundation
than previously was required or originally intended.”); see also Benjamin Spencer,
Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 433 (2008) (“[T]he Court’s new standard is a
direct challenge to the liberal ethos of the Federal Rules.”).
82
See Miller, supra note 80, at 4–5; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered
Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 909, 956–61 (1987).
83
Miller, supra note 80, at 5.
84
Id.
85
David A. Green, Friend or Foe: The Supreme Court’s “Plausible Claim” Standard
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tersely, “notice pleading is dead,” adding that the Court’s decision
86
Yet another
was “an unwarranted interpretation of Rule 8.”
portended that the Court’s “brave new procedural world,” if adopted
by the lower courts, would lead to “a procedural revolution,” and that
the Court invented a “new and foggy test” for judging the sufficiency
87
of a complaint that has “destabilized the entire system of litigation.”
These critics’ voices found support in nascent statistical studies which
suggested that their nightmares were becoming reality, as rates of
88
granting motions to dismiss appeared to rise.
Branching from this core philosophical concern were voices
within specific substantive areas that feared significant frustration of
claimants. The most vociferous opponents emerged from civil
89
90
rights and labor and employment litigation areas. In these areas,
critics lamented the added power these decisions gave to federal trial
judges, whom some scholars and practitioners already believed to be
91
making pleading very burdensome for plaintiffs.
This was a
response, no doubt, to the lack of clarity in Twombly and Iqbal, and
the hypothetical scenarios in which civil rights plaintiffs do not have
the necessary information at hand to survive a 12(b)(6) motion are
Provides Another Barrier for Plaintiffs in Employment Discrimination Cases, 39 S.U. L. REV.
1, 1 (2011) (emphasis in original).
86
Spencer, supra note 81, at 431, 433.
87
Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 3, at 823, 838.
88
By 2010, these studies suggested a greater frequency of dismissal under
Twombly and Iqbal than under Conley. See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading:
Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2010) (finding
that after Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal, respectively, Rule 12(b)(6) motions were
increasingly granted); Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95, 118
(2010) (finding dismissals increased from 54.2 percent to 64.6 percent in disability
cases after Twombly); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading
Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1014 (2009)
[hereinafter Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly] (finding a higher rate of dismissals in
Title VII cases after Twombly); but see Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About
Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions,
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1815 (2008) (stating that Twombly has had “almost no
substantive impact” except in civil rights cases).
89
See, e.g., Hatamyar, supra note 88, at 556 (finding a significant increase in the
rate of dismissal in a sample of Westlaw cases, especially for civil rights cases);
Hannon, supra note 88, at 1837 (examining Westlaw cases and finding that the courts
do not seem to be dismissing cases at a significantly higher rate, except for civil rights
cases, where the rate of granting dismissal jumped by eleven percent).
90
See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 3.
91
Id. at 521. For commentary on the general frustrations that discrimination
claims face, see Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 131–32
(2009).
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not hard to imagine. Early empirical studies seemed to justify these
concerns. These studies, compiled by academics and law students,
revealed a disproportionate increase in the dismissal of civil rights
92
cases in the months following the Court’s decisions. For example,
one law student’s study, which sampled data from 3,287 district court
cases, found that post-Twombly civil rights suits were 39.6% more
93
likely to be dismissed than other suits.
The strengthened gatekeeping power with which Twombly and Iqbal furnished judges
appeared to be making an immediate impact in exactly the way these
critics envisioned.
Indeed, concern reached a fever pitch when members of
Congress took action to address these perceived problems. In
October 2009, the House of Representatives called a hearing, held by
the Judiciary Committee, tellingly titled “Access to Justice Denied:
94
Hearing on Ashcroft v. Iqbal.” Swiftly on the heels of the hearing,
Senator Arlen Specter proposed a bill that echoed the Judiciary
Committee’s concerns. Titled the “Notice Pleading Restoration Act
of 2009” (the “Act”), the Act was designed to negate Twombly and
95
Iqbal’s effect by reinstating Conley’s “no set of facts” language. The
Act would have provided that “Federal courts shall not dismiss
complaints under rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, except under the standards set forth by the Supreme
96
Court of the United States in Conley v. Gibson . . . .” In Senator
Specter’s introduction to the Act, he indicated that one of his major
concerns with the Supreme Court’s decisions was “that the Court had
closed the courthouse doors to plaintiffs with meritorious claims and
97
limited the private enforcement of public law.” The same year, a
similar bill was introduced in the House. The Open Access to Courts

92

See Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly, supra note 88, at 1014 (“[A] higher
percentage of decisions . . . granted a motion to dismiss in the Title VII context when
the courts relied on Twombly.”); Hannon, supra note 88, at 1815 (“The rate of
dismissal in civil rights cases has spiked in the four months since Twombly.”).
93
Hannon, supra note 88, at 1838 (listing the data and explaining her
methodology).
94
Access to Justice Denied: Hearing on Ashcroft v. Iqbal Before the H. Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
(2009). During the hearing, civil rights organizations’ representatives testified about
Iqbal’s effect on access to courts, including employment discrimination cases and civil
rights cases.
95
Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009).
96
Id.
97
156 CONG. REC. S11, 037-05 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2010) (statement of Sen. Arlen
Specter).
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Act of 2009 was proposed, which provided that: “[a] court shall not
dismiss a complaint under subdivision (b)(6), (c) or (e) of Rule 12 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim
98
which would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Both bills were referred
to the Judiciary Committees but no further action was taken.
Nonetheless, these proposals were symbolic of the deep concerns that
these cases engendered from all facets of the legal community.
IV. ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER STUDIES
A. Advisory Committee Reports, 2007–2012
In 2007, immediately after Twombly, the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules also took notice that the Court’s two decisions were
99
retiring Conley’s “no set of facts” language. The Advisory Committee
is charged with carrying out “continuous study of the operation and
100
effect of the general rules of practice and procedure.” The Court’s
engagement with Rule 8 was an issue that fell directly within the
Committee’s province.
After Twombly, the Advisory Committee sought to address “[t]he
basic question [of] whether—and if so, when—to begin crafting
formal rules amendments to channel, redirect, modify, or even
101
retract whatever changes in notice pleading flow from . . . Twombly.”
98

Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
A quick note about the structure of these entities is instructive:
The Judicial Conference of the United States consists of the Chief
Justice of the United States, Chairman, the Chief Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the Chief Judge of the
Court of International Trade, the chief judges of the other twelve
United States courts of appeals and twelve district judges chosen for a
term of three years by the judges of each circuit at an annual judicial
conference of the circuit. The Judicial Conference meets twice every
year to consider administrative problems and policy issues affecting the
federal judiciary and to make recommendations to Congress
concerning legislation affecting the federal judicial system. The
Judicial Conference created the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure (Standing Committee) and various Advisory Committees
(currently one each on Appellate Rules, Bankruptcy, Civil Rules and
Criminal Rules) . . . . An Advisory Committee considers suggestions
and recommendations received from any source, new statutes and
court decisions affecting the rules and relevant legal commentary.
Thomas E. Baker, Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking Procedure, 22 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 323, 328–29 (1991).
100
Id. at 239 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (1988).
101
Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of the Civil
99
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Nonetheless, the Committee thought it best at that moment to “keep
a close watch on the evolution of practice as courts seek to digest and
102
implement [Twombly].” Contrary to the calls for immediate reform
from other sections of the legal community, the Committee decided
on a patient approach that would promote two goals: first, “to get a
better sense of how others understand Twombly, and how it has had
whatever impact it has had in the very short term of its present life.
[Second,] to consider the alternative opportunities that may be
103
available to amend present rule texts.”
The Advisory Committee returned to the issue post-Iqbal and
after a two year hiatus. The Committee’s December 2009 Report (the
“2009 Report”) revealed the results from some of the earliest
empirical work done on the issue, which was a compilation of
statistics on the frequency of motions to dismiss, and the rate of
104
granting these motions.
The 2009 Report noted that “the
preliminary data suggest that things have not changed much—the
monthly rate of granting motions to dismiss made on any ground was
13.15% of the monthly rate of filing cases during the 4 months before
the Court decided Twombly, while the rate during the 4 months after
105
the Iqbal decision was 13.78%.” On these findings, the Committee
rightly held fast to its commitment to patient investigation: “The
questions are simply too important and too difficult to be resolved by
106
rapid response.” In a moment of calm insightfulness, and possibly
acknowledging the commentators’ responses, the Committee
cautioned that “[f]aith challenged reacts vigorously,” recognizing
107
that a rash response would not help the situation.
In May of the following year, the Committee came to the
conclusion that “it does not seem that any dramatic changes have
108
occurred” to pleading, even though impressions were still tentative.
Rules Advisory Committee, December 17, 2007, 1, 12, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV12-2007.pdf
[hereinafter Advisory Committee Report, December 17, 2007].
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of the Civil
Rules Advisory Committee, December 8, 2009, at 2, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV12-2009.pdf
[hereinafter Advisory Committee Report, December 8, 2009].
105
Id.
106
Id. at 3.
107
Id.
108
Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of the Civil
Rules
Advisory
Committee,
May
17,
2010,
at
2,
available
at
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In this 2010 Report, more empirical work was provided that largely
showed statistical inactivity, but it also pointed to possible issues
within civil rights cases. The Report explained the new data points:
“The Administrative Office has carried on a continually updated
study of docket information for all civil actions filed in the federal
courts, beginning two years before the Twombly decision. The study
counts all motions to dismiss, divided among several case categories,
109
and the dispositions.”
The largely positive results were as follows:
“The findings show some increase in the rate of motions, and—for
most case categories—no more than slight increases in the rate of
110
granting motions.”
But it also drew attention to the civil rights
categories for employment cases and miscellaneous cases:
The monthly average in employment cases for nine months
before the Twombly decision was 1,147 cases, 527 motions to
dismiss (46% of cases), 169 motions granted (15%), and
108 motions denied (9%). For nine months after Iqbal, the
monthly average was 1,185 cases, 533 motions to dismiss
(45%), 185 motions granted (16%), and 80 motions denied
(7%). The monthly average in other civil rights cases for
nine months before Twombly was 1,334 cases, 903 motions to
dismiss (68% of cases), 264 motions granted (20%), and
158 motions denied (12%). For nine months after Iqbal,
the averages were 1,362 cases, 962 motions to dismiss
(68%), 334 motions granted (25%), and 114 motions
denied (8%). These figures show a substantial increase in
the percent of motions granted. But they cannot show the
111
explanation . . . .
These preliminary Reports had holes, however. As the 2009
Report acknowledged, the “Administrative Office data base . . . does
not permit distinctions between motions addressed to the pleadings
and motions to dismiss based on other grounds. Neither do the data
reveal what happens after a motion to dismiss is granted—whether
112
Nonetheless the findings
defects are cured by amendment . . . .”
stood as an important signpost for the early direction of the
conversation: patience was needed, but potential emerging
problems—particularly in civil rights cases—were not to be treated

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV05-2010.pdf
[hereinafter Advisory Committee Report, May 17, 2010].
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 2–3.
112
Advisory Committee Report, December 8, 2009, supra note 104, at 2.
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lightly.
B. Federal Judicial Center Report

113

Where the Advisory Committee felt its statistical data was underinclusive, it requested that the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) study the
filing and resolutions of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
114
in much broader terms. Casting a far wider net, the FJC set out to
115
analyze the procedural dispositions of cases from 2006 to 2010.
Over that range, the study compared motion activity in twenty-three
federal district courts, which included orders that do not appear in
116
legal reference systems like Westlaw.
The project, published in
March 2011, put forth a larger data pool on the issue than any other
117
statistical study on the effects of Twombly and Iqbal to date.
The FJC Report’s findings are significant. It revealed a general
increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate of filing of motions to dismiss
118
for failure to state a claim. In general, there was no increase in the
113

JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON
CIVIL
RULES
(2011),
available
at
http://www.fjc.gov/public
/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf [hereinafter FJC REPORT].
114
Id. at vii.
115
Id. This date range, the Report notes, filters out unwanted cases, keeping only
those that “neither anticipat[ed] the decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly nor
respond[ed] to the decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal in the absence of appellate court
guidance.” Id. at 5.
116
Id. at vii. The Report was systematic in its choice of the twenty-three federal
district courts:
We selected the 23 federal district courts to be included in the study by
identifying the 2 districts in each of the 11 circuits with the largest
number of civil cases filed in 2009. We also included the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia. On occasion we were unable to
obtain access to some of the courts’ codes necessary to identify all of
the relevant motions. In such cases, we chose the court in the circuit
with the next greatest number of civil filings. These 23 district courts
account for 51% of all federal civil cases filed during this period.
Id. at 5. Within these district courts, the Report’s researchers were able to obtain
considerable data sets. Instead of using computerized legal reference systems, the
study turned to the courts’ CM/ECF records to compile a fuller set of cases with
relevant motions. Id. This provided a more complete assessment than reference
systems because it more closely resembled excavation of files from the physical
docket sheets. Id. Furthermore, while the Report was able to assess far more cases
than any other study to date, its authors chose to exclude cases filed by prisoners and
pro se parties, and controlled for differences in motion activity across federal district
courts and across types of cases and for the presence of an amended complaint. Id.
at vii.
117
See sources cited, supra note 88 (collecting earlier studies).
118
FJC REPORT, supra note 113, at vii.
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rate of grants of motions to dismiss without leave to amend. There
was also, in particular, no increase in the rate of grants of motions to
dismiss without leave to amend in civil rights cases and employment
120
discrimination cases. Only in cases challenging mortgage loans on
both federal and state law grounds did the study find an increase in
the rate of grants of motions to dismiss without leave to amend, and
121
many of these cases were removed from state court to federal court.
The FJC Report noted that there was no reason to believe that the
rate of dismissals without leave to amend would have been lower in
122
2006 had such cases existed then.
It added that there was no
increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate at which a grant of a motion to
123
dismiss terminated the case.
The FJC Report further explained the results. The initial
findings showed a dramatic, albeit expected, increased rate of filing
motions to dismiss. Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
were filed in 6.2% of all cases in 2009–10, an increase of 2.2% over
124
the filing rate for such motions in cases in 2005–06.
Adjusted
estimates from the data indicate that the probability of a motion to
dismiss being filed in an individual case increased from a baseline of
125
2.9% of the cases in 2006 to 5.8% of the cases in 2010.
In civil
rights cases other than employment discrimination, the likelihood of
126
a motion to dismiss increased 0.4% from 2005–06 to 2009–10, an
increase that does not reach conventional levels of statistical
127
significance. The percentage of cases with one or more motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim was higher in each month of 2009–
128
“Moreover,” the FJC Report
10 than in each month of 2005–06.
notes, “in 2009–10 there appeared to be a modest increase over time
129
in the percentage of cases with such motions.” The trend line for
the percentage of cases in 2005–06 with motions to dismiss was flat

119

Id. at vii, 14.
Id. at vii.
121
Id. This category of cases tripled in number during the relevant period in
response to events in the housing market.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
FJC REPORT, supra note 113, at 8.
125
Id. at 10.
126
Id. at 9.
127
Id. at 8
128
Id. at 10.
129
Id. at 10.
120
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130

over time, at just under 4%.
According to the FJC Report, however, judges are barely
deciding these motions differently than they would have in the preTwombly-Iqbal era. The FJC Report recorded whether an order denied
the motion to dismiss in its entirety, granted all of the relief
requested by the motion, or granted some but not all relief requested
131
by the motion.
If the court allowed amendment of the complaint
with regard to at least one claim that was dismissed, the analysts
132
coded the motion as granted with leave to amend. It first appears
that motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim were more likely to
133
In
grant all or some of the relief requested in 2010 than in 2006.
2010, 75% of the orders responding to such motions granted all or
some of the relief requested by the motion, compared with almost
134
66% of the orders in 2006.
But closer inspection reveals that the
increase extends only to motions granted with leave to amend, with
135
no increase found in motions granted without leave to amend.
136

C. Memorandum of Circuit Court Cases

In addition to the strong numerical picture the FJC’s study
paints, a memorandum reviewing relevant case law was compiled by
the Advisory Committee’s clerk, Andrea Kuperman. Kuperman’s
voluminous survey primarily focuses on circuit court decisions, with a
collection of district court cases in the appendix, and spans over
seven hundred pages. Right from the beginning, Kuperman makes
an important observation:
[T]he case law to date does not appear to indicate that Iqbal
has dramatically changed the application of the standards
used to determine pleading sufficiency. Instead, the
appellate courts are taking a context-specific approach to
applying Twombly and Iqbal and are instructing the district
courts to be careful in determining whether to dismiss a
complaint . . . . The approach taken by many courts may
130

FJC REPORT, supra note 113, at 10.
Id. at 12
132
Id. at 13.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 13.
136
Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman, Rules Law Clerk to Judge Lee H.
Rosenthal, to Civil Rules Comm. & Standing Rules Comm., Review of Case Law
Applying Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal (Mar. 29, 2011),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules
/Iqbal_memo_March_2011.pdf.
131
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suggest that Twombly and Iqbal are providing a new
framework in which to analyze familiar pleading concepts,
137
rather than an entirely new pleading standard.
This observation falls in line with the FJC’s findings, but gives those
numbers a much-needed human glow. In the many cases that
Kuperman reviewed, the major trend in judicial thought process at
the circuit level corroborates the numbers from the district court
138
level.
One of Kuperman’s most interesting findings comes from a 2010
First Circuit decision authored by then-retired Justice Souter, sitting
139
by designation.
In Sepúlveda-Villarini v. Department of Education of
Puerto Rico, two public school teachers sued the Puerto Rico
Department of Education, its Secretary, and the school director for
failure to accommodate an employee’s disability as required by Title I
of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111140
12117, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.
One
teacher alleged that five years after he suffered a stroke, the school
took away accommodations made for him until that point, and
141
required him to take on a larger-than-usual number of students.
He claimed “that the new arrangement [was] an unreasonable refusal
to accommodate, resulting in emotional consequences with physical

137

Id. at 3–4.
Kuperman’s findings also implicitly bolster the FJC’s findings by pointing to
eight courts of appeal that have since reversed a number of early district court
decisions to dismiss actions. See, e.g., Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2010)
(reversing dismissal of pro se prisoner’s claims of violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983);
W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (reversing
dismissal of antitrust claims); Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Ctrs.
for Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 2010) (reversing
dismissal of claims under the Privacy Act); DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d
104 (2d Cir. 2010) (reversing in part, finding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach
of contract and defamation); Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2010)
(reversing in part, finding that plaintiff stated a claim for racial discrimination);
Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2009) (reversing the dismissal of the
Fourth Amendment claims by a prisoner against two correctional officers and a
doctor); Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009) (reversing
dismissal of claim that defendants violated fiduciary duties imposed by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)); Siracu-sano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc.,
585 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2009) (reversing dismissal of complaint alleging violation of
federal security laws), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011); Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600 (5th
Cir. 2009) (reversing dismissal of claimed violation of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1505 (2010).
139
Sepúlveda-Villarini v. Dep’t of Educ. of P. R., 628 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2010).
140
Id. at 26–27.
141
Id. at 27.
138
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symptoms requiring treatment.”
Similarly, the other teacher
alleged that, after receiving accommodations from the school for
several years after suffering a throat condition, she too was forced to
143
take on an increased class size.
The district court dismissed both
144
claims.
The First Circuit vacated the orders that held the complaints to
145
be insufficient.
After setting forth the appropriate pleading
standard that included language from Twombly and Iqbal, as well as
Conley, the court decided that the district court erred by demanding
146
“more than plausibility.”
From the two sets of alleged facts—first,
that the school provided accommodations for several years, and,
second, that the school changed these accommodations—each
147
complaint was sufficient. Justice Souter explained:
To be sure, this sequence of alleged facts does not describe
a causal connection in terms of the exact psychological or
physiological mechanism by which each plaintiff’s capacity
continues to be overwhelmed. But reading the allegations
with the required favor to the plaintiff means accepting the
changes in class size as the only variable, from which one
would infer that there probably is some causal connection
between the work of a doubled class size and the physical
148
and emotional deterioration of the disabled teacher.
He further explained that “Twombly cautioned against thinking of
plausibility as a standard of likely success on the merits; the standard
is plausibility assuming the pleaded facts to be true and read in a
149
plaintiff’s favor.” The opinion concluded:
None of this is to deny the wisdom of the old maxim that
after the fact does not necessarily mean caused by the fact,
but its teaching here is not that the inference of causation is
implausible (taking the facts as true), but that it is possible
that other, undisclosed facts may explain the sequence
better. Such a possibility does not negate plausibility,
however; it is simply a reminder that plausibility of
allegations may not be matched by adequacy of evidence. A
plausible but inconclusive inference from pleaded facts will survive
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

Id.
Id. at 27–28.
Id. at 27–28.
Sepúlveda-Villarini, 628 F.3d at 30.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 30 (citation omitted).
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a motion to dismiss, and the fair inferences from the facts
pleaded in these cases point to the essential difference
between each of them and the circumstances in Twombly,
for example, in which the same actionable conduct alleged
on the defendant’s part had been held in some prior cases
150
to be lawful behavior.
With this, the court instituted a tempered framework for “plausibility”
151
that the circuit continued to abide by in future cases.
Similarly, the Second Circuit’s reading of “plausibility” provided
152
a tamer application than one of its district court applied.
In Ideal
Steel Supply Corporation v. Anza, the plaintiff, Ideal Steel, brought an
action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
153
Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962–1968, against its competitor. After
years of complicated litigation, the district court dismissed one
plaintiff’s § 1962(a) claim on the ground that the complaint did not
sufficiently allege facts to show that the defendants’ alleged
racketeering activity was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s

150

Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Román-Oliveras v. P. R. Elec. Power Auth., 655 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2011).
There, the court echoed Justice Souter:
We hasten to add that we offer no view on the merits of his claim. The
question at this stage of the case is not “the likelihood that a causal
connection will prove out as fact.” Sepúlveda–Villarini, 628 F.3d at 30.
Rather, “the standard is plausibility assuming the pleaded facts to be
true and read in a plaintiff’s favor.” Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563
n.8, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (“[W]hen a complaint adequately states a claim, it
may not be dismissed based on a district court’s assessment that the
plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary support for his allegations or prove
his claim to the satisfaction of the factfinder.”). Here, the pleaded facts
support “[a] plausible but inconclusive inference” of discrimination
based on disability, Sepúlveda–Villarini, 628 F.3d at 30, and [Plaintiff] is
therefore entitled to proceed with his ADA claim.
Id. at 50.
152
Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 652 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 2011).
153
Id. at 313. In relevant part, Ideal alleged claims under two different provisions
of RICO—section 1962(c) and section 1962(a). Id. at 314. Section 1962(c) makes it
unlawful for any person employed by or associated with an enterprise
“to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of unlawful debt.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006). Section
1962(a) makes it “unlawful for any person who has received any
income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering
activity . . . to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest
in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise . . . .”
Id. at § 1962(a).
151
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154

injury.
The Second Circuit reversed the dismissal, noting that the lower
court’s demanded level of specificity at the pleading stage was “not
155
justified by Twombly.”
There, the higher court viewed the lower
court’s mischaracterization and misapplication of Twombly as
grounded in the lower court’s overly stringent reading of the
156
allegations.
After reminding the lower court that Twombly only
requires “[f]actual allegations [that are] enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level . . . i.e., enough to make the claim
‘plausible,’” the opinion found “nothing implausible” in the
157
plaintiff’s allegations.
For that reason, the court concluded, the
dismissal was in error.
The Sixth Circuit, in Harvard v. Wane County, applied Twombly
158
and Iqbal in a similar vein.
In that case, an infant, through her
guardian, brought a § 1983 action against employees of the Wayne
159
The mother alleged that the defendants were
County Jail.
deliberately indifferent to the infant’s serious medical needs after the
160
child was born in the jail.
The mother alleged that she went into
labor while she was detained and, after hours without medical
assessment by prison officials, began the birthing process in her

154

Ideal Steel, 652 F.3d at 313.
Id. at 324.
156
See id. at 323–24.
157
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
158
436 Fed. App’x 451 (6th Cir. 2011). In fact, the Sixth Circuit has reiterated
this application on other occasions, as have its sister circuits. See, e.g., Pulte Homes,
Inc. v. Laborers’ Int’l Union, 648 F.3d 295, 302 (6th Cir. 2011) (reversing district
court’s dismissal because it applied “too high a standard” for sufficiency); Watson
Carpet & Floor Covering, Inc. v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 648 F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir.
2011) (“There was, however, nothing more for [Plaintiffs] to plead . . . . A smoking
gun—such as an email documenting that the conspiracy was ongoing—would aid
[Plaintiff’s] case, but its absence does not render implausible that a business
continued to adhere to the conspiratorial plan. The district court gave improper
weight to the absence of reaffirmation.”) (internal citations omitted). The “smoking
gun” language comes up in other circuits, as well, and serves as a reminder that
“plausibility” did not conflate pleading and discovery. See, e.g., In re Text Messaging
Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Discovery may reveal the smoking
gun or bring to light additional circumstantial evidence that further tilts the balance
in favor of liability. All that we conclude at this early stage in the litigation is that the
district judge was right to rule that the second amended complaint provides a
sufficiently plausible case of price fixing to warrant allowing the plaintiffs to proceed
to discovery.”).
159
Harvard, 436 F. App’x at 451–52.
160
Id.
155
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161

cell. When she was finally treated by EMS, the child was born with
162
The child was resuscitated, but
no heart rate or respiration.
163
The Sixth
suffered severe mental retardation and cerebral palsy.
Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s
164
12(b)(6) motion.
In explaining its standards for motions to
dismiss, the Sixth Circuit stated that the plausibility standard does
“not alter the basic rule that plaintiffs must plead only the basic
elements of a claim, [plaintiffs need] not develop all of the facts
165
necessary to support the claim.”
Under this application, the
166
plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient under the standard.
Of course, the case law includes the inevitable decisions that
take aggressive approaches to “plausibility,” but those instances are
167
the minority.
Instead, the survey reveals a relatively stable,
tempered application of “plausibility” pleading that comports with
both the FJC’s and Advisory’s Committee’s statistical data.
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Value of Empirical Data
As a whole, empirical evaluations of procedural standards are
underemphasized in the debate about pleading standards. Yet the
value of these studies cannot be overstated. They offer the most
thorough analysis of pleading standards under Rule 8, and they
provide disinterested feedback that is needed to guide the
conversation. Numbers play a rare part in legal discourse, but they
do have a place here. In rare circumstances, statistical data is the best
guidepost for next steps, particularly where the prevailing attitude
misrepresents the realities of the situation. Without doubt, Twombly
161

Id. at 452.
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 452.
165
Harvard, 436 F. App’x at 457 (quoting Hebron v. Shelby Cnty. Gov’t, 406 F.
App’x 28, 30 (6th Cir. 2010)).
166
Id. at 457–58.
167
See, e.g., New Albany Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville Tractor, Inc., 650 F.3d 1046,
th
1050–51 (6 Cir. 2011) (“This new “plausibility” pleading standard causes a
considerable problem for plaintiff here because defendants Scag and Louisville
Tractor are apparently the only entities with the information [necessary to make the
allegation] . . . . The plaintiff apparently can no longer obtain the factual detail
necessary because the language of Iqbal specifically directs that no discovery may be
conducted in cases such as this, even when the information needed to establish a
claim . . . is solely within the purview of the defendant or a third party, as it is here.”).
162
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and Iqbal will never be held as the model of clarity, and
commentators were right to express deep concern for the potential
implications. It appears now, though, that this anxiety has gathered
too much momentum—toward “plausibility’s” speculative effects,
rather than its actual effects.
And where statistical data is given attention, the wrong studies
are being privileged. In particular, independent studies conducted
168
169
by Professors Colleen McNamara and Patricia Hatamyar, and law
170
student Kendall W. Hannon have gained the most attention. These
studies, all of which preceded the FJC’s Reports, are under-inclusive
171
and surveyed case law that was still only in its budding stages.
Professor Hatamyar’s statistical pool was derived from a random
selection of 1,200 district court cases, taken from the two years before
172
and after Twombly, as well as the four months after Iqbal. Hatamyar,
herself, cautioned that “the short time span and smaller number of
173
Iqbal cases counsel caution in interpreting the data.”
Professor
McNamara used an even smaller sample size of 196 district court
cases that cited Iqbal within the first six months following the
decision’s publication, using the commercial legal database Westlaw
174
to compile the list. Kendall Hannon’s study engaged in the largest
data pool, with 2,212 cases citing Conley and 1,075 citing Twombly, but
175
was published before the Court decided Iqbal.
The FJC’s pool of cases was significantly larger. The study
examined motion activity in 2006 and 2010 and, importantly,
compiled cases based on their orders made available through the
federal district court records rather than only opinions published in
176
computerized legal reference systems.
The analysts selected cases
from twenty-three district courts, with two districts from each of the
eleven circuits with the most civil cases filed in 2009, including the
177
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
The
168

Colleen McNamara, Iqbal as Judicial Rorschach Test: An Empirical Study of District
Court Interpretations of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 401 (2011).
169
Hatamyar, supra note 88.
170
Hannon, supra note 88.
171
For these studies’ results, see discussion supra Section III.
172
Hatamyar, supra note 88, at 555–56.
173
Id. at 556.
174
McNamara, supra note 168, at 420 (explaining selection methodology in
further detail).
175
Hannon, supra note 88, at 1834–35.
176
FJC Report, supra note 113, at 5.
177
Id.
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result was a staggering 49,443 cases with 12(b)(6) motions filed
within ninety days of filing the case in 2005-06, and 52,925 cases with
178
the same posture in 2009-10. Kendall Hannon’s 3,287-case pool—
the largest of the three—is only roughly 3% of the FJC’s total. The
FJC, with its greater resources and staff, was able to cover an
exponentially larger number of cases in order to determine a more
complete picture of “plausibility” application throughout the federal
court system. But the picture is useless unless commentators take
time to look at it. Given the wealth of new information the FJC has
made available, and the indication that little has changed, the legal
community should use this information as the new starting-point for
determining whether change is needed.
B. How the Courts are Reading “Plausibility”
Before either the FJC’s reports or Kuperman’s memo were
published, Professor Adam Steinman predicted that the lower courts
would read the Supreme Court’s decisions in a way that preserved
179
pre-Twombly precedent.
First, Professor Steinman noted the
decisions could not have overruled pre-Twombly authority, as such a
rejection can only occur through the rule amendment process, not
through judicial interpretation of Rule 8; it is simply not within the
180
Court’s power to effectuate that type of change.
Second, even if
Rule 8 could be reasonably interpreted to require a stricter pleading
standard, the fifty years of procedural precedent would insulate the
181
Rule from such interpretation. Specifically, Twombly only abrogates
182
one line from all the cases—the “no set of facts” language. Third,
Justice Souter’s analysis of the “no set of facts” language was
183
inexact. The language was, in practice, subject to a different, more
sensible reading than matched what Justice Souter endorsed in
Twombly. Professor Steinman explains, Conley’s “no set of facts”
language did not preclude dismissal as long as any set of facts could
entitle the plaintiff to relief (the straw man that Twombly purported to
strike down). Rather, this phrase merely confirmed that speculation
about the provability of a claim is typically not a proper inquiry at the
pleadings phase; provability is relevant only when it appears ‘beyond
178
179
180
181
182
183

Id. at 9.
Steinman, supra note 6, at 1320–21.
Id. at 1320.
Id. at 1320–21.
Id. at 1321.
Id. at 1321.
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184

doubt’ that the plaintiff cannot prove her claim.
The end result, Professor Steinman writes, is that “plausibility”
pleading will not be a dramatic departure from the days of Conley
because “lower courts have, essentially, a duty to reconcile Twombly
185
and Iqbal with pre-Twombly case law.”
The FJC Report’s empirical findings have largely proved
Professor Steinman’s predictions to be correct. And Kuperman’s
case studies reveal how that is happening. The lower courts are
playing an important role in shaping “plausibility” pleading as a
tempered standard by making Twombly and Iqbal compatible with
previous case law. Her cases identify several aspects of the two
decisions that are playing recurring roles in the reconciliation
process.
Uncertainty in a complaint is proving to be less troublesome to
litigants. First, a line in Twombly that garnered attention has ended
up being a source of taming “plausibility”: “[f]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if
186
doubtful in fact).”
The line has become commonplace in circuit
187
courts’ expressions of the Rule 8 precedent, and implies an
allowance of far more uncertainty at the pleading stage than as first
feared. By offering the assumption of truth to doubtful facts,
plaintiffs are resorting to this expression to help nudge their claims
away from merely threadbare assertions.
To further this reading, many courts have focused their analyses
on the statement that “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if
it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable,
188
and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’”
Here, courts
have picked up on the language of doubt—”improbable” and
“remote and unlikely”—to acknowledge that “plausibility” pleading,
for all its terminological changes, is still just that—an inquiry into
184

Id. (citation omitted).
Steinman, supra note 6, at 1323.
186
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (emphasis added).
187
See, e.g., Sepúlveda-Villarini v. Dep’t of Educ. of Puerto Rico, 628 F.3d 25, 29
(1st Cir. 2010); Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir. 2010); Arar v.
Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 618 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co.,
578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009).
188
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974). For judicial application of this phrase, see, e.g., Watson Carpet & Floor
Covering, Inc. v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 648 F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir. 2011); OcasioHernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011).
185
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pleadings, where discovery-like facts are not required.
Finally, Iqbal’s statement that “[d]etermining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
189
experience and common sense.”
Rather than serve as a tool for
190
arbitrary judicial enforcement of “plausibility” as has been argued,
this sentence has worked to preserve relative consistency in
determining sufficiency. Where the lack of clarity within Twombly and
Iqbal could lead to inconsistent results, judicial experience is
consistently invoked to remind lower courts to read allegations under
the full spectrum of Rule 8 precedent—that is, to reign in judicial
inquiries that interpret “plausibility” in an aggressive manner.
C. How Should We Respond?
The upshot of these results should guide the conversation in a
less reactionary direction by allowing the common law process to
191
continue carving a path for “plausibility” pleading.
The primary
fear that a quick response was needed to neutralize Twombly and Iqbal
before it affected countless litigants is quickly being extinguished.
The proposed changes rest on the assumption that pleading
standards became harmfully strict; yet the assumption does not stand
muster when compared to the trends that the FJC Report indicates.
Accordingly, the argument for change develops cracks in its
foundation.
A common approach to addressing “plausibility” is that change
192
should come internally through the Court’s overruling of Iqbal.
One commentator has suggested that “[t]he best, and easiest, fix to
this [‘plausibility’] problem is for the Iqbal case to be overruled and
for Twombly to be read according to the ‘transactional’ method . . . .”
193
instead of a “conclusory” method ushered in by Iqbal. But it is not
189

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
See generally McNamara, supra note 168.
191
The Advisory Committee has suggested that it shares this sentiment. See
Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of the Civil Rules
Advisory
Committee,
May
2,
2011,
at
53,
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV05-2011.pdf.
192
See, e.g., Luke Meier, Why Twombly Is Good Law (But Poorly Drafted) And Iqbal
Will Be Overturned, 87 IND. L.J. 709 (2012).
193
Id. at 759. The “transaction method” is, in short, a reading of Twombly where a
complaint is factually sufficient so long as it explains the underlying transaction or
events that point to the defendant’s liability; and this method. Id. at 741. The
“conclusory” interpretation of Twombly—the one that some believe Iqbal has
inappropriately adopted—finds a complaint factually insufficient, and thereby
190

SILAGI (DO NOT DELETE)

276

1/10/2014 3:51 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:247

clear that overruling the decisions would be justifiable under the
principles of stare decisis. Specifically, proponents of this approach
would have to explain its unworkability. While initial concerns about
“plausibility” may have given rise to colorable arguments for the
standard’s unworkability, the case studies and reports suggest that is
not the case in practice. In fact, the lack of significant change
between pre- and post-Iqbal empirical data suggests that these issues
have not been exacerbated in any meaningful way by “plausibility”
itself. Of course, that is not to say that the pleading as a whole could
not use revision; the doctrine is far from perfect. But what the
numbers do tell us is that Twombly and Iqbal are not the impetus for
those problems. Without that critical link, any reasoning that
pleading standards need revision specifically because of these cases
does not hold water.
If anything, the sweeping change that critics believe will restabilize the pleading process has the potential to do just the
opposite. This holds especially true in regard to proposed rule
amendments. With any amendment, particularly to a rule that
maintains the entryway to the court, uncertainty in application will
initially cause confusion and threatens to affect almost all civil cases
brought after that time.
Conversely, based on case development and data, the position
that Twombly and Iqbal did not break the federal pleading system
should encourage the Advisory Committee to maintain its current
course. The devil, now, is in the details of the Twombly and Iqbal, and
incremental advancements of district and circuit courts’
understanding of “plausibility” will ensure that the system can
improve itself without risking a major, potentially unsettling jolt.
VI. CONCLUSION
Determining the necessity of change requires the availability of
diverse sources. The FJC and Advisory Committee have advanced the
conversation immensely with their research. Their findings largely
confirm the predictions of commentators like Professor Steinman,
who anticipated a tempered application of “plausibility” pleading.
And where the FJC Report’s empirical data lacks judicial analysis,
Kuperman’s Advisory Committee memo fills in the gaps. It is now the
legal community’s obligation to acknowledge these results and to use
subject to a “plausibility” analysis, because it contains conclusory allegations. Id.
Because the “transactional method” is more true to Rule 8, the Court can ostensibly
snuff out the “conclusory” approach by expressly overruling Iqbal.
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them to redirect any misguided positions. The solutions need to be
reframed to account for the tempered application of that precedent.
Only then, with full attention given to the practicalities of
“plausibility,” can a legitimate reevaluation be made of Twombly, Iqbal,
and the entire pleading system. Nonetheless, while the reevaluation
is being crafted, the main point still stands: litigants can safely plead
on.

